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RECENT CASES
Antitrust Law-Clayton Act-Statistics of
Market Concentration and Increased Market
Share are Insufficient to Show Violation of
Section 7 When Other Factors Mandate a
Conclusion that Competition will not be
Substantially Lessened by the Contested
Acquisition
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
The United States brought a civil antitrust action pursuant to
section 7 of the Clayton Act' challenging the acquisition2 of a coal
mining company by a competing company and its successor, Gen-
eral Dynamics Corporation. 3 The Government contended that ag-
gregate statistics of past production demonstrated that within cer-
tain geographic markets4 the coal industry was becoming increas-
ingly concentrated in a small number of large producers.5 It further
1. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970): "No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly
or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any
part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially
to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."
2. The instant acquisition was in the form of a horizontal merger, which is the "acquisi-
tion by one company of all or part of the stock or assets of a competitor which offers the same
goods or services in the same market area." E. KINTNER, AN ANTrrRUST PRIMER 90 (2d ed.
1973).
3. By 1959, Material Service Corp., a deep shaft coal mining company, acquired a
controlling interest in the stock of United Electric Coal Companies, a strip mining company,
operating in Illinois and Kentucky. In 1967, Material Service was itself acquired by defendant
General Dynamics Corp.
4. The Government's statistics were based on production in the proposed geographic
markets of "the State of Illinois and the Eastern Interior Coal Province Sales Area, the latter
being one of four major coal distribution areas recognized by the coal industry" and com-
prised of parts of several midwestern and southern states. 415 U.S. 486, 490 (1974).
5. Evidence of the trend toward concentration offered by the Government included
statistics that the top 2 coal producers in Illinois increased their market share from 37.8% to
52.9% from 1957 to 1967; in the Eastern Interior Province the increase of the top 2 was from
29.6% to 48.6% in the same period. For the top 10 firms, the increase in market share was
from 84.0% to 98.0% in Illinois and from 65.5% to 91.4% in the Eastern Interior Province. Also
indicative of the concentration trend in the same ten-year period was the decrease in the
number of coal producing firms in Illinois from 144 to 39, or a drop of 73%. Id. at 494-95.
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contended that the contested acquisition materially enlarged the
market share of the combined compqny,l which contributed toward
concentration in the industry and substantially lessened competi-
tion in violation of section 7. Defendants asserted that other perti-
nent factors,7 including the changing nature of the coal industry, its
resultant widespread use of long-term requirements contracts, and
the depletion of the acquired company's mineable coal reserves,
significantly affected both the coal industry and the defendants'
ability to compete and required a conclusion that the contested
merger did not adversely affect competition, Finding no substantial
lessening of competition resulting from the acquisition, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois rendered
judgment for defendants.' On appeal9 to the Supreme Court of the
United States, held, affirmed. In a civil antitrust action brought
pursuant to section 7 of the Clayton Act challenging the acquisition
of a coal company by a competing company and its successor, sta-
tistical evidence of market concentration and increased market
share of the combined company is insufficient to establish a sub-
stantial lessening of competition when an analysis of other pertinent
6. The Government's statistics also indicated that the acquisition raised the combined
company's market share to as much as 12.4% of the Province market and 23.2% of the Illinois
market in 1959. In 1967, these figures were 10.9% and 21.8%. Id. at 496.
7. Defendants asserted that changes in the coal industry such as decreases in the de-
mand for coal, the inability of coal to compete with other sources of energy, the increasing
dependence of coal producers on large scale sales to utilities, and the increasing use of long-
term commitments of coal reserves to meet utilities' coal consumption requirements were all
crucially relevant to the Court's assessment of the competitive effects of the instant merger.
Additionally, defendants claimed that the acquired company, a strip mining coal producer
and the acquiring company, a deep shaft mining company, were essentially complementary
rather than competitive producers. Finally, defendants asserted the near complete depletion
of the acquired company's mineable reserves was a circumstance demonstrating that antici-
pated anticompetitive effects as a result of the merger were unrealistic. For a full analysis of
these factors, see the district court opinion in United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 341
F. Supp. 534 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
8. Id.
9. Appeal was brought under § 2 of the Expediting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1970). The
Government sought to attack the district court holding on several grounds: (1) that the
district court committed legal error by giving undue consideration to facts occurring after the
effective acquisition in 1959; (2) that defendants' reliance on depleted and committed re-
sources was essentially a "failing company" defense for which defendants failed to satisfy the
burden of proof; (3) that the findings of the district court were not supported by the evidence
on record and should be overturned under the "clearly erroneous" standard of FED. R. CIv.
P. 52(a); (4) that the district court's reliance on evidence of the acquired company's weak
position as to uncommitted reserves was improper since the company might either purchase
new reserves or develop expertise to recover its then existing deep reserves; and (5) that the
district court made improper determinations of the proper product and geographic markets
as a precondition to an assessment of the probabilities of a substantial effect on competition
within them.
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factors affecting the coal industry and defendants' business demon-
strated that no lessening of competition had occurred or was likely
to occur. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486
(1974).
II. BACKGROUND
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Celler-
Kefauver Act of 1950,10 prohibits any corporate acquisition whose
effect is substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce in any section of the country.
Congress enacted the amended statute for the express purposes of
controlling monopolistic tendencies in their inception" and preserv-
ing small business as a vital part of economic life.1 2 Since, however,
Congress provided no definite quantitative or qualitative tests by
which enforcement agencies could ascertain whether the effects of
a given merger substantially lessened competition or tended toward
monopoly, settlement of the section 7 issue became a task of judicial
interpretation.' 3 To identify the relevant criteria for determining
whether competition had been lessened, two tests emerged: first, the
per se standard, characterized by the assumption that statistical
data describing market structure will determine conclusively the
anticompetitive effects of a merger; 4 and secondly, the rule-of-
reason standard, employing a case-by-case examination of all rele-
vant economic factors in order to ascertain the probable economic
consequences of a merger.'" The first case in which the Supreme
Court set forth a detailed analysis of the scope and purposes of
10. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
11. S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1950); H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 11 (1950).
12. See, e.g., 96 CONG. REc. 16444, 16448, 16450 (1950); 95 CONG. REC. 11486, 11489,
11498 (1949).
13. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 321 (1962). For a thorough investiga-
tion into the legislative history of the Clayton Act, see 370 U.S. at 311-23. See also Note,
Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A Legislative History, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 766 (1952).
14. This standard was known as the rule of "quantitative substantiality" in Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 298, 314 (1949), a case brought under § 3 of the Clayton
Act. Essentially, the standard states that when a merger forecloses a quantitatively substan-
tial portion of the relevant market, it is legitimate to infer a significant lessening of competi-
tion without considering other economic factors. Comment, 19 VAD. L. RPv. 1373, 1374 &
n,5 (1966).
15. Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 50 F.T.C. 555, 572 (1953) (Court of Appeals rejected the
quantitative substantiality test in considering a § 7 case and adopted a rule-of-reason ap-
proach). See Comment, Clayton Section 7: A Critical Appraisal of the Supreme Court's
Antitrust-Anti-Bigness Complex in Merger Litigation Since theBrownShoe Case, 11 WAYNE
L. Ray. 739, 754 (1965).
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amended section 7 was Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,'" a 1962
decision, in which the Court invalidated a merger between the na-
tion's fourth and twelfth largest shoe manufacturers. Although the
Court utilized an elaborate array of economic data to support the
merger invalidation, the opinion was generally read to reject the per
se standard" and to adopt an empirical, rule-of-reason approach for
determining the potential anticompetitive effects of mergers. The
Court noted that Congress clearly indicated that a merger must be
viewed functionally, and judged in the context of the particular
industry.'" One year later, however, in United States v. Philadelphia
National Bank,'" the Court emphasized the decisive relevance for
section 7 purposes of statistical data evidencing concentration in an
industry and market share increase for the two combining firms.
The Court averred that congressional concern with the trend to-
wards concentration "warrants dispensing, in certain cases, with
elaborate proof of market structure, market behavior, or probable
anticompetitive effects."2 Adhering to the rationale enunciated in
Philadelphia National Bank, the Court in United States v. Alumi-
num Co. of America" essentially ignored defendant's evidence de-
scribing general market characteristics2 and relied instead on the
16. 370 U.S. 294 (1962). Mr. Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the majority, noted that
the amendment represented Congressional concern with "what was considered to be a rising
tide of economic concentration in the American economy." Id. at 315.
17. "[Ihe Court in Brown Shoe has deliberately preserved a great deal of uncertainty,
has created a high degree of flexibility, and has consciously established an opportunity for a
full inquiry into the economic, competitive circumstances of all but the most obviously bad
or obviously good mergers." Rahl, Current Antitrust Developments in the Merger Field, 8
ANTITRUST BULL. 493, 508 (1963).
18. 370 U.S. at 321-22. "Statistics reflecting the shares of the market controlled by the
industry leaders and the parties to the merger are, of course, the primary index of market
power; but only a further examination of the particular market-its structure, history, and
probable future-can provide the appropriate setting for judging the probable anticompeti-
tive effect of the merger." Id. at 322, n.38.
19. 374 U.S. 321 (1963). The Court invalidated a merger between the second and third
largest of Philadelphia's 42 commercial banks.
20. 374 U.S. at 363. Statistical data in the case showed that if the merger of the 2 banks
were consummated, making the combined bank the largest in the area with 30,% of the
market, the 2 largest banks would control 59% (up from 44%) of the area's commercial
banking business. Despite evidence offered by defendants that there would in fact be no
anticompetitive effects resulting from the merger, the Court stated: "Without attempting to
specify the smallest market share which would still be considered to threaten undue concen-
tration, we are clear that 30% presents that threat." Id. at 364-65.
21. 377 U.S. 271 (1964). The Court invalidated the acquisition by Aluminum Company
of America (Alcoa) of the Rome Cable Corporation, because, although the merger increased
Alcoa's market share of the aluminum conductor industry by only 1.3%, the acquisition would
eliminate "an aggressive competitor" in an industry showing a trend toward concentration.
Id. at 281.
22. The district court in Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), following the directives of
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structural aspects of the market to invalidate a merger. Moreover,
the Court emphasized the importance of preventing even minimal
increases in concentration to preserve the possibility of eventual
deconcentration, particularly in an industry in which high concen-
tration already exists.23 Subsequently, the Court concluded in
United States v. Continental Can Co. 4 that a merged firm's control
of twenty-five percent of the relevant market resulting from the
contested acquisition "approache[d] that held presumptively bad
in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank .... "25 Finally,
two 1966 section 7 antimerger decisions, United States v. Von's
Grocery Co.21 and United States v. Pabst Brewing Co.,27 further
eroded the Brown Shoe approach that had called for an appraisal
of all relevant economic factors in assessing a merger's anticompeti-
tive effect. These two decisions firmly established that the Govern-
ment could show a prima facie violation of section 7-even when the
district court had found that competition had not been, nor in the
future would be lessened 28-when merger statistics demonstrated
both a decline in the number of competitors,29 and control by the
Brown Shoe, regarded as significant the ease with which competitors could enter the market,
the increase in the number of manufacturers in the preceding 10-year period, testimony from
customers and competitors alike that they neither experienced nor anticipated any adverse
effects from the merger, and active price cutting taking place in the industry as evidence that
statistics alone were insufficient to show anticompetitive effects. United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 214 F. Supp. 501, 517 (N.D.N.Y. 1963). See also United States v. Continental
Can Co., 217 F. Supp. 761, 781-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
23. 377 U.S. at 279.
24. 378 U.S. 441 (1964). The Court declared Continental Can's (nation's second largest
producer of metal containers) acquisition of the Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. (third largest producer
of glass containers) invalid because the merger increased Continental Can's share of the
combined glass and metal container market from 21.9% to 25% and reduced the number of
significant competitors who might challenge its position from 5 to 4. Id. at 461.
25. Id.; see note 20, supra.
26. 384 U.S. 270 (1966). The Court ruled that a merger between the third and sixth
largest Los Angeles area grocery chains violated § 7.
27. 384 U.S. 546 (1966). The Court reversed a district court's dismissal of the Govern-
ment's § 7 challenge of the acquisition of Blatz Brewing Co. (nation's 18th largest) by Pabst
Brewing Co. (nation's 10th largest).
28. The district court in Von's Grocery emphasized the "vigorous competition" of Los
Angeles area food retailing: continued entry of new firms, successful expansion of formerly
one store supermarkets, efficient single store units, the emergence of wholesale and discount
houses, and the availability of from 2 to 10 stores within convenient shopping distance of the
average customer. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 233 F. Supp. 976, 981-83 (S.D. Cal.
1964).
29. In Von's Grocery, facts showing a long and continuous trend toward fewer individu-
ally owned competitors (from 5,365 to 3,818 in an 11-year period) were "enough to cause us
to conclude . . . that the Von's-Shopping Bag merger did violate § 7." 384 U.S. at 274. "If
ever such a merger would not violate § 7, certainly it does when it takes place in a market
characterized by a long and continuous trend toward fewer and fewer owner-competitors
which is exactly the sort of trend which Congress, with power to do so, declared must be
arrested." Id. at 278.
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merged firm of an undue portion of the relevant market." Thus,
five3' decisions in the 1960's retreated from the broad empirical
analysis of Brown Shoe in favor of a narrower inquiry based on
statistics of market structure. By emphasizing market share and
concentration data and avoiding any burdensome economic analy-
sis, the Court formulated a rigid, easily definable rule for determin-
ing whether a merger substantially lessens competition.2 Conse-
quently, the Court created for purposes of section 7 a presumption
against corporate growth through merger.
III. THE, INSTANT OPINION
The instant court recognized at the outset that in prior deci-
sions33 involving horizontal mergers4 it had found prima facie viola-
tions of section 7 of the Clayton Act when the Government intro-
duced aggregate statistics showing a trend toward market concen-
tration and an increase in the combined company's market share.
Noting that the Government's statistical showing,35 the accuracy of
which was neither discredited by the district court nor contested by
defendants, would have sufficed to establish undue concentration
under this prima facie approach," the Court characterized the issue
in the instant case as whether other pertinent factors affecting the
coal industry and defendant's business mandated a conclusion that
no substantial lessening of competition had occurred or was threat-
ened by the contested acquisition. Recalling Brown Shoe, the Court
stated that, although significant, statistics reflecting market share
30. In Pabst, the Court found 4.49, 11.32, and 23.95 to be the percentages of the na-
tional, tri-state and Wisconsin beer markets absorbed by the merger, and even the 4.49% in
the national market was declared "sufficient to show a violation of § 7 ." 384 U.S. at 551-52.
31. For other similar Supreme Court decisions handed down during this period in
addition to those covered in text, see United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158
(1964); United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964); United States v.
El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964). For a later decision further illustrating the
use of statistical data as the basis for finding § 7 violations see United States v. Phillipsburg
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350 (1970).
32. Rill, The Trend Toward Social Competition Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
54 GEO. L.J. 891, 898 (1966).
33. The Court cited United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United
States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v. Continental Can Co., 378
U.S. 441 (1964); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964); United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
34. See note 2, supra.
35. See notes 5 & 6, supra.
36. The Court noted that the figures presented by the Government relating to the
degree and increase of concentration in the coal industry compared favorably to statistics
presented in United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966), and United States v.
Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966). Additionally, Government figures showing market
share increase as a result of the instant merger were analogous to those in Pabst and
Continental Can.
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and concentration were not conclusive determinants of a merger's
anticompetitive effects.37 The Court then reviewed the findings of
the district court relating to the changes in the patterns of coal
distribution38 and reasoned that, because of the changes in the na-
ture of the coal industry and the consequent reliance of the industry
on long-term contracts,39 the state of available reserves and not past
production constituted the most reliable indicator of market power.
Pointing out that the acquired company had committed virtually all
its mineable coal reserves under such long-term contracts,19 the
Court declared that its ability to compete effectively for subsequent
contracts had become severely limited. Thus, the Court concluded
that the district court properly analyzed the company's relative
weakness as a competitor in light of the factors considered,4' and
this weakness fully substantiated the conclusion that, despite sta-
tistical evidence of market share increase and market concentra-
tion, the acquisition would not substantially lessen competition.
2
37. See note 18, supra.
38. See note 7, supra.
39. The Court alluded to the fact that long-term requirements contracts were necessar-
ily mandated by the coal industry's increasing dependence on utilities as consumers of coal.
The utilities demand long-term commitments from coal producers as an assurance of a steady
supply. Moreover, such contracts generally are necessary from the viewpoint of the coal
producers since they provide a security base for the financing of capital investments by
producers.
40. The district court found that of the more than 52 million tons of currently mineable
reserves held by the acquired company, only 4 million tons had not already been committed
under long-term contracts. 341 F. Supp. 534, 538.
41. The Court also found as follows with regard to the Government's attack on the
district court's decision on the merits (see note 9, supra): (1) the district court was justified
in relying on post-acquisition evidence relating to changes in the amount of the acquired
company's coal reserves, since such evidence necessarily implied that the company was
unable to compete effectively for subsequent contracts; (2) it was immaterial that defendants
failed to meet the prerequisites of the "failing company" defense, since the evidence of
inadequate coal reserves substantiated the conclusion that the company did not have capac-
ity to compete; (3) the findings of the district court were supported by the evidence in the
record and thus not "clearly erroneous"; (4) the district court was correct in finding that new
strip mining reserves were unavailable, and the fact that the company might someday acquire
the expertise to mine deep reserves does not depreciate the validity of the conclusion that
the company did not at the time of trial have the capacity to compete effectively for subse-
quent contracts; and (5) because the district court properly found that the Government's
statistical evidence did not establish that a substantial lessening of competition was likely
to occur in any market, the issues of the relevant geographic and product markets need not
be considered.
42. A vigorous 4-man dissent led by Mr. Justice Douglas attacked the majority's han-
dling of the issues brought before the Court on appeal by the Government (see notes 9 & 41,
supra). The dissent felt that the Court: (1) wrongfully refused to consider the issues of the
relevant geographic and product market; (2) failed to discuss and employ the strict standards
of the "failing company" defense, which the dissent felt applicable in the instant case; and
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IV. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS
Subsequent to the instant decision, the Supreme Court indi-
cated that the evaluation of relevant economic factors in addition
to statistics of market concentration will indeed constitute the stan-
dard for evaluating the effects of a merger on competition in section
7 decisions. In United States v. Marine Bancorporation,"3 a section
7 decision involving a challenge to a bank merger and based on the
doctrine of potential competition,44 the Court indicated that al-
though strong statistical evidence of concentration in the banking
industry established a prima facie case of lessening competition in
violation of section 7, the defendant banks could satisfy their bur-
den by showing that the concentration ratios, recognized as possibly
unreliable indicators of actual market behavior, did not depict ac-
curately the economic characteristics of the relevant geographic
market." Though the banks failed to sustain the burden of rebutting
the statistics and the Court decided against the Government on
issues other than the standard applied in antimerger cases, the lan-
guage of the opinion constitutes strong evidence of the Court's new
approach to antimerger litigation.
Additionally, the Supreme Court denied certiorari" in the case
of Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC,47 in which the Tenth Circuit,
focusing on evidence of concentration, affirmed an FTC divestiture
order directed at the acquisition by the nation's largest copper pro-
ducer of the nation's largest producer of coal. The merger was held
invalid by the Tenth Circuit because the financial and other re-
sources of the combined company resulted in a marked potential to
accelerate the trend toward concentration in the coal industry and
tended to lessen competition within the industry. The Court's re-
fusal to hear the Kennecott case may indicate something of the
outer limits within which the empirical approach heralded by the
instant decision may be employed successfully, demonstrating that,
(3) improperly allowed the defendants to establish defenses on purely post-acquisition evi-
dence, in violation of the limitations that should be placed on such evidence. The dissent
further stated that the majority opinion was based on a record "devoid of findings based on
correct legal standards" and represented a "deep-seated judicial bias against § 7 of the
Clayton Act."
43. 94 S. Ct. 2856 (1974).
44. See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 410 U.S. 526 (1973) (the doctrine that a
merger may substantially lessen competition by eliminating a firm that, absent the merger,
might have entered the market de novo and thus would assist in deconcentrating that market
over the long run).
45. 94 S. Ct. at 2875.
46. 94 S. Ct. 1617 (1974)(mem.).
47. 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972).
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in the most obvious case of market control as illustrated by statisti-
cal data, no evaluation of other factors could be constructed that
would rebut such overwhelming evidence of anticompetitive effect.
V. CRITIQUE
The instant opinion portends a basic shift in the Court's atti-
tude toward the method of analysis used to determine the effects of
a merger on competition: away from the rigid application of statisti-
cal data showing market concentration to establish a prima facie
violation of antimerger laws toward the empirical, case-by-case
analysis originally used in Brown Shoe. With the Court now indicat-
ing a willingness to undertake a complete economic analysis of
mergers and acquisitions," a Government challenge of these combi-
nations is no longer tantamount to success in establishing a section
7 violation. While the Government can still establish a prima facie
violation by statistical showing of substantial or increasing market
concentration, defendants can introduce a broader range of evidence
including other economic and market considerations to rebut that
showing. Having probably lessened the restraining fear of antitrust
prosecution by leaving business executives more confident that, in
borderline cases, other pertinent factors can rebut a statistical
showing of lessened competition, the decision will likely promote a
more realistic assessment by courts of anticompetitive effects in
section 7 cases and result in a possible increase in mergers.
The Court's apparent willingness to engage in such a broad
analysis in section 7 cases seems desirable for several reasons. First,
it appears from the legislative history of the Act that Congress envi-
sioned the courts undertaking an evaluation of all relevant economic
factors to determine whether anticompetitive effects resulted from
a merger." Further a model based largely on statistical data of
market concentration is static and tends to preserve the present
market structure without a thorough analysis of market realities or
probable effects on competition. Strict application of rigid stan-
dards ostensibly to preserve competition and protect small business
does not necessarily produce a favorable result, either for the small
48. Such a broad analysis is of a type that earlier cases sought to avoid: "[W]e must
be alert to the danger of subverting congressional intent by permitting a too-broad economic
investigation . . . . And so in any case in which it is possible . . . to simplify the test of
illegality, the courts ought to do so in the interest of sound and practical judicial administra-
tion." United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963).
49. See S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1950). See also REPORT OF THE ATroRNEY GENERAL's NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY
THE ANTrrRuST LAws 122 (1955).
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business unit or the economy as a whole. 0 Fear of antitrust prosecu-
tion might restrict market transactions for capital assets, which
would thereby preserve marginal competitors by preventing their
participation in a horizontal combination. Preservation of a large
number of marginal competitors does not necessarily result in the
optimum level of competition, and size per se is not illegal' and
should not be equated with anticompetitive effect.2 Seemingly, the
competitive objectives of antimerger law have been infused with a
theory characterized by socio-political feelings of hostility towards
large, integrated corporations constrasted with friendliness toward
small, independent business units . 3 The Court has in the recent
past attempted to preserve these social and political values by
applying the simplest available criteria in antimerger cases-
statistics demonstrating a decreasing number of competitors and
an increasing market share in the hands of a few. In the instant
opinion, however, the Court has returned its emphasis to a method
of analysis characterized by an examination of the relevant eco-
nomic factors and a consideration of statistical data of market struc-
ture, a seemingly desirable result since it represents a realization
that only through a wide-ranging economic inquiry can the Court
realistically assess and regulate economic and market behavior for
the benefit of the public.
Hopefully, the Court will take the next logical step and attempt
to verbalize the criteria against which the judiciary should measure
the facts of a merger or acquisition in order to determine whether
the merger may lessen competition. Changes in demand or in effi-
ciency, ease of market entry, motives for the merger, existing and
potential competition, and any other economic effects of a merger
should be considered in addition to Government statistical data to
ascertain whether statistics characterize the true nature of the mar-
ket and create valid assumptions about the effects on competition.
50. Phillips, Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Antimerger Decisions, 21 S.W.
L.J. 429, 443-50 (1967).
51. "The law, however, does not make the mere size of a corporation, however impres-
sive, . . . an offense, when unaccompanied by unlawful conduct . . . ." United States v.
International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 708 (1926); see C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST
POLICY 106 (1959). But see United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 458 (1964):
"Where a merger is of such size as to be inherently suspect, elaborate proof of market
structure. . . may be dispensed with in view of Section 7's design to prevent undue concen-
tration."
52. See Comment, Clayton Section 7: A Critical Appraisal of the Supreme Court's
Antitrust-Anti-Bigness Complex in Merger Litigation since the Brown Shoe Case, 11 WAYNE
L. REv. 739, 786 (1965).
53. See Rill, supra note 32, at 895.
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Setting forth the proper antitrust guidelines for business and Gov-
ernment would better define and effectuate the goals of antimerger
laws and would help to make these laws more responsive to
economic reality.
MICHAEL D. KELLY
Criminal Procedure-Federal Habeas Corpus-A
Writ of Habeas Corpus May Be Issued in Advance
of Trial to Prevent Double Jeopardy When a
Juvenile Has Been Previously Adjudicated a
Delinquent
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Petitioner was adjudicated a delinquent and committed to a
juvenile institution by a state juvenile court after his arrest on a
charge of rape and subsequently was indicted by a grand jury for
the same offense.' The state criminal court dismissed the indict-
ment on the ground that it subjected petitioner to double jeopardy,
but the appellate level reversed, holding that the juvenile court
judge should have waived jurisdiction and certified the case to crim-
inal court pursuant to state statutes.2 The State Supreme Court
affirmed the appellate decision and ordered the indictment rein-
stated.3 Alleging that his prosecution under the indictment would
violate the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment 4 and
transgress fundamental fairness concepts of the fourteenth amend-
1. Petitioner Roger Fain was age 16 when he was arrested in Volusia County, Florida
and charged with rape. Five days after his arrest juvenile court counsel filed a petition
alleging Fain a delinquent by reason of the criminal charge. The juvenile court judge adjudi-
cated Fain a delinquent after hearing arguments on the State Attorney's request that the
judge waive jurisdiction and certify the case to state criminal court. The indictment was
handed down nine days later.
2. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.02(6)(a) (1967), as amended, Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 231, § 3
(permitting discretionary waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction over youths charged with cer-
tain felonies); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.02(6)(c) (1967) (mandatory waiver of juvenile court
jurisdiction after an indictment alleging a crime -punishable by death or life imprisonment is
returned). The juvenile court judge declined to relinquish jurisdiction or stay execution of the
commitment of Fain to the Youth Services Division.
3. R.E.F. v. State, 265 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1972) (per curiam), aff'g State v. R.E.F., 251
So. 2d 672 (Fla. App. 1971).
4. "[Nlor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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ment,5 petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus to terminate his
physical custody, which had been prolonged because of the indict-
ment.' Rejecting the State's arguments that petitioner had not ex-
hausted state remedies and that jeopardy did not attach in juvenile
adjudications,8 the United States District Court for the Middle Dis-
trict of Florida declared further prosecution unconstitutional and
granted a writ of habeas corpus compelling petitioner's release., On
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
held, affirmed. The prolongation of a juvenile delinquent's physical
custody because of attempted prosecution under an indictment al-
leging the same offense for which the juvenile was previously adjudi-
cated a delinquent and that has been fully challenged in the state
courts justifies federal habeas corpus relief in advance of the crimi-
nal trial because the trial would violate the double jeopardy provi-
sions of the fifth amendment and fundamental fairness concepts of
the fourteenth amendment. Fain v. Duff, 488 F.2d 218 (5th Cir.
1973), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3667 (U.S. May 25, 1974)
(No. 73-1768).
II. BACKGROUND
The writ of habeas corpus traditionally was used to review the
legality of a prisoner's detention and to compel his release if the
grounds for the detention were found to be legally inadequate.' 0
Early habeas corpus hearings rarely were concerned with the valid-
ity of judicial decisions, but looked only to the competency of the
sentencing court." While the availability of habeas corpus relief was
5. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment has been held in a variety of
cases to require that a state act in accordance with concepts of fundamental fairness in
prosecutions of individuals. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (California
procedure permitting comment on a defendant's failure to testify in his own behalf not
unfair).
6. The Director of Youth Services testified that Fain had been sufficiently rehabilitated
to be released from the correctional facility and readied for placement, but he had not been
released for fear of immediate arrest and trial on the outstanding indictment.
7. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970), which provides: "An application for a writ of habeas
corpus . .. shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the
remedies available in the courts of the State .. "
8. The State Attorney contended that since a juvenile delinquency adjudication was not
a "conviction," see [FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.10(3) (1967), no jeopardy attached to the adjudica-
tion. Alternatively, he argued that the double jeopardy clause did not apply to juvenile
proceedings in any case. See note 43 infra.
9. Fain v. Duff, 364 F. Supp. 1192 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
10. Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HAlv. L. REv. 1038, 1042-
45 (1970).
11. See Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
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guaranteed in the Constitution,1 2 the trauma of Reconstruction
prompted Congress to enact a statute that expressly authorized
federal habeas corpus relief, subject to certain requirements of cus-
tody and exhaustion of state remedies.1 3 The availability of this
relief increased over the years as the courts expanded the substan-
tive scope of habeas corpus review, relaxed the degree and nature
of restraint necessary to meet the jurisdictional custody require-
ment, and interpreted more restrictively the statutory exhaustion
provision. The substantive expansion of federal habeas corpus re-
view of state court decisions resulted largely from the continuing
incorporation of various constitutional liberties within the four-
teenth amendment due process clause." For example, the double
jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment has been expressly incorpo-
rated" making custody in violation of that clause a ground for fed-
eral habeas corpus relief.'6 The concept of jeopardy is still develop-
ing, and recently has been extended in mistrial," parole,'" and juve-
nile proceeding cases.'9
12. "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when
in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9,
cl. 2.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1970). The Act provides that "[w]rits of habeas corpus may be
granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge
within their respective jurisdictions...." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (1970). The Act further states
that "[t]he writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless ... [hie is in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States . . . ." 28 U.S.C. §
2241(c)(3) (1970). The exhaustion requirement is set forth in note 7 supra. See Developments
in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 10, at 1048.
14. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 413-14 (1963); Developments in the Law-Federal Ha-
beas Corpus, supra note 10, at 1041.
15. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
16. United States ex rel Russo v. Superior Ct., 483 F.2d 7 (3d Cir. 1973) (granting
habeas corpus relief to petitioner, free on bail after a mistrial, on grounds of double jeopardy).
17. E.g., Thomas v. Beasley, 491 F.2d 507 (6th Cir. 1974) (jeopardy attached to a trial
stopped after partial testimony of the prosecutrix). But see Illinois v. Sommerville, 410 U.S.
458 (1973) (holding that the double jeopardy clause did not bar retrial after a mistrial if
"manifest necessity" and the "ends of public justice" required the retrial).
18. E.g., United States ex rel Marrero v. Warden, Lewisburg Pen., 483 F.2d 656 (3d Cir.
1973), rev'd, 94 S. Ct. 2532 (1974) (concerning denial of parole eligibility in a narcotics
statute).
19. E.g., Jones v. Breed, 497 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1974) (granting habeas corpus on the
ground that the double jeopardy clause prohibited petitioner's conviction as an adult follow-
ing his adjudication as a delinquent on the same charge). Certain due process safeguards have
been extended to juvenile hearings. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), extended due process rights
in the areas of notice, counsel, confrontation, and self-incrimination to juvenile proceedings,
and enunciated the standard of "fundamental fairness" to be applied in considering constitu-
tional guarantees to be provided in juvenile hearings. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970),
mandated that the standard of guilt beyond reasonable doubt be applied in juvenile proceed-
ings. The Court declined to require a jury trial in juvenile actions, however, stating that not
all rights assured an adult are to be imposed on the juvenile process and noting that a jury is
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Since the federal habeas corpus statute provides no specific
guidelines in its provisions requiring custody and exhaustion of state
remedies, those requirements have been subject to extensive judi-
cial relaxation. In Fay v. Noia21 the Supreme Court held that a
peititioner need exhaust only those state remedies available to him
at the time of his petition and that adherence to state procedural
rules is not a prerequisite to federal habeas corpus review. In Jones
v. Cunningham2' the Court held that a paroled prisoner was suffi-
ciently restrained of his liberty to meet the custody provision of the
writ.22 The Court in Walker v. Wainwright2 determined that relief
other than immediate release from custody could properly be
granted through the writ. 2A The Court continued this trend of relaxa-
tion in Peyton v. Rowe2 by abandoning the doctrine of prematur-
ity,2 which held that a prisoner's challenge of a sentence in advance
of his incarceration under that sentence was premature, allowing a
prisoner serving two consecutive sentences to challenge the second
while still confined under the first. The Court reasoned that a pris-
oner should not be required to serve a prolonged sentence before he
is permitted to challenge the cause of its longevity.? The Burger
Court followed the trend in Hensley v. Municipal Court,?8 in which
it found that a person released under his own recognizance was
sufficiently restrained of his liberty to satisfy the custody require-
ment. Furthermore, in Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court,2 the
Court held that an interstate detainer issued by Kentucky authori-
not a prerequisite to accurate fact-finding. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
As a result of the increased application of constitutional standards in juvenile court proceed-
ings a judicial trend recognizing jeopardy in delinquency adjudications has developed. For a
detailed study of this trend see Rudstein, Double Jeopardy in Juvenile Proceedings, 14 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 266 (1972).
20. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
21. 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
22. The Court noted the historical evolution of the writ: "[Habeas Corpus] is not now
and never has been a static, narrow, formalistic remedy; its scope has grown to meet its grand
purpose-the protection of individuals against erosion of their right to be free from wrongful
restraints upon their liberty." Id. at 243.
23. 390 U.S. 335 (1963).
24. The Court noted that the habeas statute does not deny federal courts the power to
fashion appropriate relief other than immediate release from physical confinement and that
courts may dictate such relief as law and justice require. Id. at 337. See Carafas v. La Vallee,
391 U.S. 234 (1968) (granting a writ of habeas corpus although petitioner had been uncondi-
tionally released during the habeas proceedings).
25. 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
26. The prematurity doctrine was established in McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934).
27. "Common sense dictates that prisoners seeking habeas corpus relief after exhaust-
ing state remedies should be able to do so at the earliest practicable time." Id. at 64.
28. 411 U.S. 345 (1973).
29. 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
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ties had a substantial, adverse impact on the confinement condi-
tions of a prisoner serving a sentence in Alabama, and therefore the
prisoner was deemed to be in the custody of Kentucky authorities
and a writ of habeas corpus could be properly directed to those
authorities. In Braden the writ was issued before the prisoner had
been tried in Kentucky courts, and it compelled the state to attempt
extradition of the prisoner for prompt trial. The Court emphasized
the affirmative nature of the relief sought in the pretrial writ and
cautioned that the decision was not to be interpreted as permitting
"the derailment of a pending state proceeding by an attempt to
litigate constitutional defenses prematurely in federal court." 3 That
caveat parallels the Burger Court's strong assertion of the absten-
tion doctrine in cases directly challenging state criminal statutes
and procedures in federal courts. In Younger v. Harris3 the Court
applied this doctrine when it expressly limited the availability of
federal injunctive relief, holding that pending state criminal pro-
ceedings should not be enjoined except in unusual circumstances
when intervention is necessary to prevent immediate, irreparable
harm.32 The abstention doctrine is based on interests of comity,
federalism, and respect for the integrity of proceedings in state
courts.3 3 These same considerations have tempered the wide appli-
cation of federal habeas corpus relief in the past 34 and have recently
prompted a proposed amendment to the Federal Habeas Corpus
Act.35 Referring to those interests in his concurring opinion in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte," Justice Powell argued that petitions
for habeas corpus founded on fourth amendment claims should be
limited to those claims that impugn the integrity of the fact-finding
process or bear directly on the innocence of the accused. Fifth
amendment grounds for habeas corpus relief may not be susceptible
to those proposed limitations, however, since the Court recently
30. 410 U.S. at 493.
31. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
32. Accord, Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971);
Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971) (extending the doctrine to declaratory relief). The
Court in Younger held that "[t]he threat to the plaintiff's federally protected rights must
be one that cannot be eliminated by his deferse to a single criminal prosecution." 401 U.S.
at 46; see O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499 (1974). See also Steffel v. Thompson, 415
U.S. 452, 460-61. (1974).
33. 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
34. See Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886).
35. S. 567, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). For critical commentary on the proposed amend-
ment see Wulf, Limiting Prisoner Access to Habeas Corpus-Assault on the Great Writ, 40
BROOKLYN L. REv. 253 (1973); Note, Proposed Modification of Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners-Reform or Revocation?, 61 GEo. L.J. 1221 (1973).
36. 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973).
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held in a case concerning the retroactivity of a Supreme Court deci-
sion that procedural and nonprocedural constitutional rights are not
necessarily subject to the same analysis and limitations.37 Thus,
recent cases evidence two conflicting trends: The extension of fed-
eral habeas corpus relief through relaxed custody and exhaustion
requirements and expanded substantive scope, and the reaffirma-
tion of federal court abstention with its threatened impact on fed-
eral habeas corpus.
III. THE INSTANT DECISION
Recognizing that a grant of pretrial habeas corpus relief re-
quired strong justification, the court in the instant case considered
the traditional uses of the writ and examined recent cases relaxing
custody and exhaustion prerequisites. Relying on Peyton v. Rowell
the court found that the custody requirement was satisfied because
the outstanding indictment had a substantial, adverse effect on the
conditions of petitioner's confinement. 9 The court next considered
the statutory exhaustion requirement and the reluctance of federal
courts to litigate prematurely constitutional defenses to state ac-
tions and found that the state supreme court's definitive ruling on
the instant constitutional claim exhausted available state reme-
dies." The court further reasoned that in the instant case, as in
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court,41 petitioner had not asserted
merely a federal defense to a criminal prosecution, but sought to
enforce a constitutional right that could and should be vindicated
without awaiting state trial.42 Having determined that custody and
exhaustion requirements were satisfied, the court considered the
merits of petitioner's constitutional claim and found that since peti-
tioner had been adjudicated a delinquent and committed to a
37. See Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505 (1973) (holding that the double jeopardy
prohibition of Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970), should be applied retroactively).
38. See notes 26-27 supra and accompanying text.
39. The court said that it would look beyond labels to substance in finding that peti-
tioner was confined. It then held that any proceeding that may result in incarceration places
a person, either adult or juvenile, in jeopardy.
40. The court rejected the state's contention that the defense could be raised again at
the criminal trial and on appeal, noting that the chances of the state courts' changing their
position and acquitting petitioner on those grounds were extremely remote.
41. See notes 29-30 supra and accompanying text.
42. The instant court recognized the distinction made by the Court in Braden between
an affirmative obligation and a prohibition mandated by a writ of habeas corpus, but found
that distinction not applicable to these facts. In his dissent to the denial of a rehearing en
banc in the instant case, Judge Clark argued that the majority opinion cut across the express
caveat in Braden disclaiming the intention to allow pretrial litigation of constitutional claims.
488 F.2d at 228; see text accompanying note 30 supra.
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correctional institution by a judge having the power to restrain sig-
nificantly a juvenile's freedom, and since the adjudication was
founded on a violation of state criminal law, jeopardy attached to
the proceedings.43 Reasoning that the state's subjection of petitioner
to its powers by indicting him as an adult required that he be ac-
corded all the constitutional rights available to an adult, the court
held that the fifth amendment protection against double jeopardy
must be accorded him. The court held also that concepts of funda-
mental fairness precluded the state's prosecution of petitioner as an
adult after a prior delinquency adjudication based on the same
offense.4 Since petitioner had fully litigated these contentions to no
avail in the state courts, the instant court affirmed the district
court's grant of habeas corpus relief in advance of the criminal trial.
IV. CRITIQUE
Although the instant court's decision to issue a writ of habeas
corpus in advance of trial was a departure from the customary exer-
cise of that remedy, the facts of the instant case, together with the
Supreme Court's recent decisions relaxing custody and exhaustion
requirements, justified the court's action. The conditions of peti-
tioner's custody more than met the standard required in Hensley v.
Municipal Court,45 and the prolongation of petitioner's detention
justified the application of the adverse effect rationale of Braden v.
30th Judicial Circuit Court and Peyton v. Rowe.4" Further, the in-
stant court correctly held that petitioner's challenge of the state's
indictment at all levels of the state courts rendered further litigation
of his constitutional claims in the state system futile and that his
petition for habeas corpus was therefore appropriate to prevent pro-
longed unconstitutional deprivation of petitioner's liberty." In both
Braden and the instant case state remedies had been exhausted, but
the Braden decision was expressly limited by the Court's caveat
43. The court rejected the state's contention that under the McKeiver rationale, peti-
tioner had no constitutional right not to be put twice in jeopardy. See note 19 supra.
44. The court followed its decision in Hultin v. Beto, 396 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1968), in
which it held unconstitutional the prosecution of a juvenile previously adjudicated a delin-
quent. Since Benton v. Maryland had not yet been decided, the court in Hultin relied on the
fundamental fairness argument instead of the double jeopardy clause. See note 15 supra and
accompanying text. In the instant case the court found that the juvenile court judge had acted
within his power and discretion in declining to waive jurisdiction. For a detailed discussion
of Florida juvenile court procedures and the question of jeopardy therein see Commentary,
Juvenile Court: Due Process, Double Jeopardy, and the Florida Waiver Procedures, 26 U. FLA.
L. REv. 300 (1974).
45. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
46. See notes 26 & 29 supra and accompanying text.
47. See Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968); notes 26-27 supra and accompanying text.
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disclaiming authorization of premature litigation of constitutional
defenses.18 The instant Court properly was undeterred by that ca-
veat, but failed to explain its position adequately. The court also
failed to confront the mandate of abstention expressed by the
Burger Court in Younger v. Harris and other cases." While the
instant case involved litigation of a constitutional claim in advance
of trial, that claim had already been litigated by petitioner in state
courts before the federal hearing, a circumstance that removes the
instant case from the scope of the Braden caveat and distinguishes
it from Younger. Moreover, since petitioner had been subjected once
to the state's punitive power, the instant case could have been char-
acterized under the Younger reasoning as an unusual situation in
which federal injunctive or declaratory relief was arguably appropri-
ate to prevent repeated prosecution. To have allowed the proposed
trial to occur would have prevented complete vindication of peti-
tioner's constitutional rights because the double jeopardy clause
prohibits a second prosecution, not only a second punishment.5
Since this constitutional mandate is nonprocedural in nature, the
reasoning of Justice Powell's opinion in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte
proposing limitations on federal habeas corpus in the interests of
comity is inapposite. 52
As the Court found in Fay v. Noia,53 the initial consideration
of a federal court that considers a habeas corpus petition should be
whether the petitioner's constitutional claim had been considered
adequately at the state level, not whether the petitioner had re-
sorted to every conceivable state remedy. The practical limitation
that the Supreme Court placed on the exhaustion requirement in
that case should include the prevention of a state trial when the trial
will provide no practical opportunity for fruitful consideration of the
constitutional claim and will result only in the petitioner's pro-
longed unconstitutional confinement. While granting federal habeas
corpus relief before state trial may conflict with the concept of fed-
eral abstention, when the merits of a petition warrant the issuance
of the writ, state procedural devices and interests of comity should
not be permitted to interfere with the prompt vindication of the
petitioner's constitutional rights. 4 The unusual circumstances of
48. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
49. See notes 32-33 supra and accompanying text.
50. Id. Cf. notes 8, 19, 43 supra and accompanying text.
51. United States ex rel. Russo v. Superior Ct., 483 F.2d 7, 12 (3d Cir. 1973).
52. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
53. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
54. See text accompanying notes 31-36 supra.
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the instant case probably limit its impact since occasions in which
a constitutional claim has been litigated by a petitioner in advance
of state trial and therefore justify pretrial federal habeas corpus
consideration will be rare. Similar circumstances may arise, how-
ever, in cases of mistrial,55 interstate detainers," or prosecution for
one offense by more than one court of the same sovereign.5 7 In each
of these cases, the opportunity exists for an accused to challenge the
second prosecution in advance of the state trial. Unless the accused
is successful in his challenge at the trial court level, however, he
faces the possibility that the appellate court may treat his claim as
an interlocutory matter, not appealable at that stage. After such a
ruling, federal habeas corpus would not be timely since the claim
would not have been litigated fully in the state courts. But in cir-
cumstances such as those of the instant case, a federal court can
properly hear a habeas corpus petition. Therefore, in the appropri-
ate situation the instant case stands as a well-reasoned precedent
for pretrial habeas corpus review of state court actions resulting in
unconstitutional confinement. 8
ROBERT D. TUKE
55. See Thomas v. Beasley, 491 F.2d 507 (6th Cir. 1974); note 17 supra.
56. See Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct., 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
57. See Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970); note 37 supra.
58. Several cases have expressly followed the instant decision. See, e.g., Jones v. Breed,
497 F.2d 1160, 1165 (9th Cir. 1974) (granting habeas corpus to a juvenile confined as a result
of a criminal conviction subsequent to a delinquency adjudication); State ex reL. Kelley v.
Rawlins, 289 So. 2d 444 (Fla. App. 1974) (granting a writ of prohibition barring the trial of a
juvenile on an indictment returned after a delinquency adjudication, although that adjudica-
tion had been dismissed because of a procedural infirmity).
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